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A, CRITICAL COMMENT ON THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-CRIMINATION
The periodically recurrent agitation for bigger and better
reforms was ushered in last year by the five to four decision of
the United States Supreme Court in the Olmstead Case.' The
pronouncement by the majority of the court that wire tapping
was not a search and seizure within the purview of the Fourth
Amendment 2 of the Federal Constitution and therefore the use
of any information so acquired was not compulsory self-crimi-
nation, as prohibited by the Fifth Amendment, 3 met with nation-
wide publicity, thousands of letters were addressed to the
Supreme Court, some horrified at the violation of the "privi-
lege," others mildly reproving, still others indulging in scathing
denunciations of those jurists who had the effrontery to abridge
somewhat or somehow the inviolable privileges enumerated in
the Constitution.4
The haziness, the uncertainty, the doubts exhibited in the
minds of the decriers of the Supreme Court, as to the actual
meaning, scope, the limitations and modifications of the privi-
lege prompt this epitome of the privilege. We will endeavor to
set forth the privilege in a critical manner, stating as briefly as
is feasible, its history and its construction.
The exemption from testimonial compulsion arose, in Amer-
ican law, shortly before the formation of the union.r, Today it
is firmly imbedded in the concrete of judicial determinations;
but it has not been so always. From 1215 to about 1625, com-
pulsion as a means of extracting self-criminatory responses was
'Olmstead v. United States, 48 Sup. Ct. 564, 277 U. S. 438, 72 L. Ed.
944. Brandeis, Holmes, Butler, and Stone, JJ. dissenting.
"'The right of the people, to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall
not be violated.. "
'"No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be witness against himself."
IThe Law Reviewers have seized this opportunity to launch into
metaphysical discussions of the Olmstead case. Dean Wigmore approves
of the case, in XXIII M. Law. Rev. at 377; see also Search and Seizure,
27 Mich. L. Rev. 78; The Supreme Court and Unreasonable Searches,
38 Ya7e L. J,. 77, and a case note in 77 Pa. L. R. 139, and 6 N. Y. U. L.
Rev. 75.
5For excellent Histories of the privilege, see Wigmore, see. 2250
(references to Wigmore in this article are to the first edition); 15
Harv. L. R. 610; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14.
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a common feature of the courts of England;5* it was not till
late in the 17th century that this practice was seriously ques-
tioned, and in the early eighteenth that the compulsion was re-
moved and the privilege began to take a definite form and sub-
stance. It became entrenched in the Common Law,6 and before
the adoption of the federal constitution, five states7 had bul-
warked the privilege by providing in their constitutions that
no man shall be compelled to give evidence against himself in
criminal cases. Since then all the states, except New Jersey and
Iowa, have included such a provision, and the Fifth Amend-
ment of the Federal Constitution likewise bestows the right of
silence. New Jersey and Iowa, despite their lack of constitutional
privilege, nevertheless grant it by virtue of the common law.
See State v. Zdanowicz for the New Jersey Rule; and State v.
Height9 for the Iowa version.
The constitutional phraseology neither enlarges nor narrows
the scope of the privilege as understood, developed and accepted
in the common law.1 0 This leads to several important conse-
quences:
1. A clause protecting a person from being a "witness
against himself" protects a witness as well as an accused-that
is, a party defendant.1
2. A clause exempting from "self-criminating testimony in
criminal cases" protects equally in a civil case, where the fact
probed for will advise of a criminal act done.12
3. The privilege is applicable to all courts, grand juries,
preliminary inquiries, etc.13
4. The converse of proposition No. 2 supra, if by a dex-
terous manipulation of the wording we could educe one, does not
5* See Felton's Case, (1628) 3 How. St. Trials 367, and an article,
"Torture Under English Law" in 75 Pa. L. Rev. 344.
4 The common law is the only system of jurisprudence that recog-
nizes the privilege Wigmore see. 2251.
'North Carolina, 1776; Pennsylvania 1776; Virginia 1776; Mass.
1780; N. Hamp. 1784. It is well known, of course, that the first ten
amendments bind only the Fed. Govt. Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Peters
243.
,69 N. J. L. 619, 55 Atl. 743. See also In re Haines, 67 N. 0. L.
442, 51 Atl. 929.
'117 Iowa 650, 91 N. W. 935.
'0 Wigmore, see. 2253.
United States v. Herron, 28 F. (2d.) 122.
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 12 Sup. Ct. 195.
uWigmore, sec. 2253.
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obtain. Facts tending to expose one to a civil liability are not
within the scope of the privilege.
14
5. In the United States, if the natural or logical result of
the testimony tends to expose the infamy of the witness, or react
to his disgrace, it is not, and should not, be. privileged, unless
the question asked concerns an immaterial fact.
Social ignominy with its resultant ostracism was not within
the contemplation of the creators of the privilege, so in this
country, this slim pretext for the utilization of the privilege has
long been "abandoned. It is replaced by judicial restriction of
cross-examination as to character.15 Thus character itself is not
a subject that may be probed into, merely reputation, and the
right to inquire with respect to reputation is limited by the
rules of relevancy.
A digression is here perhaps permissible. We have stated
supra that impending disclosure of civil liability is not sufficient
to invoke the privilege. In equity that is not precisely so.
Where a right of property will be divested or money will be paid
to another for a wrong or misconduct' 6 by way of penalty equity
will not decree discovery. So also where a forfeiture.is involved,
chancery will not require the interrogatories to be answered.
The rule is succinctly stated in the Boyd case17 as'follows: "Now
it is elementary knowledge that one cardinal rule of the Court
of Chancery is never to decree a discovery which might tend to
convict the party of a crime, or to forfeit his property." This
is no doubt explained, in part, by equity's well known abhorrence
of forfeitures.
We are now confronted with the problem: Does the privi-
lege exist when it would reveal a crime under a foreign sov-
ereign ? Thus if A is testifying in New York in a civil action,
can he refuse to answer on the ground that his reply would fur-
1, Id. 2254; and Boston & Maine R. R. v. State, 75 N. H. 513, 77 AtL
996; State v. Heffernan, 28 R. 1. 20, 65 A. 284.
15Compare the dissenting opinion of Justice Field in Brown v.
Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 16 Sup. Ct. 644, 40 L. Ed. 819, and the old New
Jersey cases. Vaughen v. Perrine, 3 N. J. L. 299; Fries v. Brugler, 12 N.
3. L. 79. See also Lohman v. People, 1 N. Y. 378, 49 Amer. Dec. 340,
holding that a witness is privileged not to answer questions tending
to disgrace himself only where they are immaterial to the issue except
so far as they affect his credibility.
Speidel v. Barstow Co., 232 Fed. 617.
"IBoyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 66, 6 Sup. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 756, 50 L. Ed.
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nish evidence of a crime for which he might be punished in
Illinois? No. The privilege does not extend to testimony rev-
elatory of a crime under a foreign sovereign. 18 The reason is
self-evident. There is no double jeopardy and by the abstruse
reasoning which deduces that lack, the analogy is apt, and Lo!
the mirage of the privilege dissolves and through the dissipating
haze we see that the privilege is not omnipresent.19
There is no vestige of the privilege which permits even the
pretense of excluding answers which would incriminate third
persons only. The favored use of this subterfuge and the one
to which is had most frequent resort is illustrated in the case of
the corporate employee or officer and the corporation.
In Hale v. HenkeJ20 the defendant pleaded privilege on the'
ground that it would incriminate the corporation. Held, not
so. The privilege is personal and a shield only to the person tes-
tifying. It has been held, also, that the Fifth Amendment does
not apply to corporations. They, being creatures of the state,
can possess no secrets, as to the sovereign who created them.
21
The facts "tending to criminate" which are protected are
not only those facts which directly criminate the witness, but
also responses which lead up to sef-crimination, as for example
the showing of the letter, in Aaron Burr's Trial.2 2 This doe-
trine does not apply however to any fact which merely, under
some conceivable expectation, might form a part of a crime.
It does apply:
1. To a fact which is relevant to an inquiry whose sole or
essential object is to charge or fasten a crime on a witness: e. g.
an accused in a criminal case.
2. To a witness, not a party, against whom it is desired
to prove a crime by way of impeachment.23 If the question
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43; Cf. United States v. Lombardo, 241
U. S. 73, 36 Sup. Ct. 508, refusing to pass on the question which the
lower court had decided contra to the weight of authority, 228 Fed.
980; United States v. McRae, L. R. 3 Ch. 79, and further compare King
of the Two Sicilies v..Wilcox, 1 Sim. N. S. 301.
"For Double Jeopardy see: Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13; Gilbert
v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325, 41 Sup. Ct. 125, 65 L. Ed. 287; United States
v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377, 43 Sup. Ct. 141, 67 L. Ed. 314.
201 U. S. 43, 26 Sup. Ct. 370, 50 L. Ed. 652.
Id; also Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. U. S., 251 U. S. 385. Curiously
enough the Fourth Amendment does apply to corporations. 40 Sup. Ct.
182, 64 L. Ed. 319.
Robertson's Rep. 1, 208 (at 244) Fed. Cases, No. 14692E.
mWigmore, see. 2260.
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asked, divulges by the required answer a clue to the commission
of a crime, which involves others, but does not necessarily im-
plicate the testifier, it is privileged.
2 4
The privilege protects a person from any testimonial dis-
closure sought by legal process against him as a witness.2 5  It
follows, therefore, that documents or chattels produced by order
of a subpoena or other legal process, are also privileged, but doc-
uments or chattels obtained from the person's control without
the use of process against him as a witness, are not privileged
and may be used against him, evidently. 26  The Federal
Courts are contra, following the leadership of the Week's case,27
holding that if federal agents violate the Fourth Amendment in
securing evidence, they cannot use it because of the Fifth Amend-
ment. Boyd v. U. S.28 was the forerunner of the current fed-
eral trend that distinguishes violations of the Fourth Amend-
ment by also stigmatizing them as infractions of the fifth. The
overwhelming majority of the states refuse to follow the Supreme
Court and do admit illegally seized evidence provided no legal
process is required to secure it.29 If, however, federal agents
are not involved, the United States Courts will avail themselves
of illegally seized evidence.
3 0
When a document is "official" it is not privileged, as it is
made by an official holding a public trust, and liable therefore,
at any time, to inspection as a memorial open to the public.
These documents may be secured by legal process.31
Where a document is withheld because it is privileged, no
inference of its contents may be made. However, psychiatrists,
alienists, and other mental specialists, have uncovered nothing
which will prevent the jury from thinking that if the defendant
'2 It should not be privileged, but it apparently is. See Ward v.
State, 2 Mo. 120, at 122.
2Wigmore, sec. 2263.
State v. Mausert, 88 N. I. L. 286, 95 AtM 991; People v. Defere,
242 N. Y. 13; 150 N. E. 585.
21232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652. See also Goured v.
United States, 255 U. S. 298, 41 S. Ct. 261; Marron v. United States, 48
Supreme Court 74, 275 U. S. 192, 72 L. Ed. 231.
28 116 U. S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746.
-"See opinions of Taft and Brandeis in Olmstead v. U. S., 48 Sup.
Ct. 564, 277 U. S. 438, 72 L. Ed. 944, thoroughly discussing this phase.
See Wigmore, sec. 2264, wherein the noted author deplores the con-
fusion of the Fourth and fifth amendments.
"B'urdeau v. MeDowall, 256 U. S. 465, 41 Sup. Ct. 574, 65 L. Ed.
1048.
Wigmore, sec. 2264.
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were innocent he would present the document to exonerate him-
self. No anaesthetic has been produced which will cause a ces-
sation of the jury's cerebral processes.
The privilege encompasses testimonial evidence only. An
inspection of the bodily features of the witness is not a violation
of the privilege.32 Unless an attempt is made to secure an oral
or written communication from the witness, the demand made is
not a testimonial one, and, therefore, not privileged. Hence a
request that a defendant roll up his sleeves, or expose his chest
or stand up to be identified is not privileged, and the witness
must comply. However there are two exceptions to this:
1. The defendant cannot be required to speak for identifi-
cation purposes.
2. The defendant cannot be compelled, to famish speci-
mens of his handwriting for purposes of comparison.8 3 The spirit
governing the exceptions is obvious: They are testimonial in
nature and hence privileged.
We now avail ourselves of another digression. This time
we compare the privilege with confessions. This can be effected
very simply by dividing the similarities or contrasts into three
sections:
1. The privilege extends only to court room statements
made under process as a witness, whereas the inadmissible con-
fession comprises statements made in or out of court, but se-
cured by compulsion.
2. Where the privilege is waived, a wrongfully obtained
confession may be excluded.
3. The privilege embraces witnesses testifying in civil and
criminal cases, whereas confessions may issue only from accused
persons in criminal cases.
3 4
The privilege merely grants the right of refusal to answer
and does not prohibit the addressing of the question to the wit-
ness. Peruse any constitutional provision appertaining to the
privilege and it is at once apparent that the answer alone is pro-
tected. 35 It follows, then, that a witness cannot object to the
State v. Miler, 71 N. J. L. 527, 60 A. T. L. 202; State v. Ah Ghuey,
14 Nev. 79; State v. Garrett, 71 N. C. 85, 17 Am. Rep. 1.
3Wig-more, sec. 2265.
"For a comprehensive development of the subject see Wigmore,
sec. 2266.
"IU. S. Const. Amend. V is typical: "No person shall be compelled
to be a witness against himself."
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question, but he may decline to reply.36 It is a non sequitur,
however, to maintain that a defendant can be called as witness
in a criminal case for the express (or perhaps sole) purpose of
interposing queries which the prosecution knows, or believes,
that the defendant need not answer because privileged. In civil
cases though, the defendant can be called and questioned, al-
though he need not answer.
3 7
The old English practice, 1725 et circa, was to have the pre-
siding judge warn the witness that the question was one he need
not answer. This has grown obsolescent in the United States,
and today in the majority of the states, the trial judge is under
no duty to caution the witness as to the existence of his privi-
lege,38 although his right to do so still of course persists.
The witness on the stand, whether he be a defendant or a
witness, is the only person who can avail himself of the privi-
lege. 9 Counsel may not resort to an objection in order to ap-
prise the witness that the question carries with it the option of
refusing to answer. 40 As the privilege is peculiarly personal, the
logic and reasonableness of this liihitation is self-evident.
41
The witnesses may not arbitrarily refuse to answer. They
must -state the reason for their non-disclosure. The danger
must be real and appreciable, for the constitutional protection
does not extend to remote possibilities out of the ordinary course
of the law.4 1 If the question clearly calls for an incriminating
answer, the witness need only plead the privilege, and not reveal
his testimony to the court. However, the statement by the wit-
ness that his answer would incriminate him is not conclusive;
the solution is to be determined primarily by the trial court.
42
Chief Justice Marshall, with his customary clarity, laid down the
rule, in Aaron Burr's ease, 43 as follows:
21 Board, etc. v. Maretti, 93 N. . D. 513, 117 AtI. 483.
1, Wigmore, see. 226$ and cases there cited.
Id. 2269.
United States v. Price, 216 U. S. 488, 30 Sup. Ct. 257, 54 L. Ed.
581.
40 See Rapeljes' Law of Witnesses, sec. 265; Wrottesley's Examina-
tion of Witnesses, p. 20.
"4Helce v. United States, 227 U. S. 131, 33 Sup. Ct., 226, 57 L. Ed.
450. 4uMason v. United States, '244 U. S. 362, 37 Sup. Ct 621, 61 L. Ed.
1198.
" Robertson's Rep. I, 243, 'Federal Cases No. 14692E.
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"When a question is propounded, it belongs to the court to
consider and to decide whether any direct answer to it can im-
plicate the witness. If this be decided in the negative, then he
may answer it without violating the privilege which is secured to
him by law. If a direct answer to it may criminate himself,
then he must be the sole judge what his answer would be. The
court cannot participate with him in this judgment, because
they cannot decide on the effect of his answer without knowing
what it would be; and a disclosure of that fact to the judges
would strip him of the privilege which the law allows."
It is to be observed that the Mason case, note 42 supra, was
decided in 1917, whereas Aaron Burr's case was disposed of in
1807, a lapse of one hundred and ten years. To this we add:
Where the answer is clearly incri=-inatory the privilege applies.
Otherwise not.
44
The general rule in the United States is that a witness'
silence shall not and cannot be referred to or commented upon.
The Supreme Court, in a most illuminating opinion, decided
contra to this, under the particular facts of the case in Twining
v. State of New Jersey.4 5 The trial judge in New Jersey had
commented on the failure of the defendant to take the stand in
his own behalf. Conviction had resulted and defendant had sub-
sequently appealed. New Jersey, as has been shown'above, has
no constitutional privilege provision. The Supreme Court held
that the suspension of the privilege, if there is no state consti-
tutional privilege, is not a violation of the due process clause4a
and also that the right to non-compulsory testimony is not a priv-
ilege and immunity of citizens of the United States. The Twin-
ing case was no doubt affected by the settled law in New Jersey
empowering the trial judge to comment upon the witness'
speech, or failure thereof. The General rules are as follows:
1. Comment by counsel on failure of accused to testify is
forbidden. This is reversible error in Oklahoma and Iowa.4 7
2. This applies to the ordinary witness also.
3. This prohibition against drawing inferences applies to
defendant's silence at prior or preliminary examinations.48
"See State v. Thaden, 43 Minn. 253, 46 N. W. 447.
4 211 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14, 53 L. Ed. 97.
"8United States Constitution, Amendment XIV.
47 See Chap. 68, See. 11 of Revised Statutes of Oklahoma; see also
State v. Baldoser, 88 Iowa 55, 55 N. W. 97.
"Wigmore, Sec. 2272.
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4. , No inference is to be drawn from nonproduction of priv-
ileged documents. (See above) (Page 6.)
A most compelling argument in favor of the ban against in-
ferences is found in Wigmore. To paraphrase him.
49
One of the real purposes of the privilege is to have the pro-
secution information leading to defendant's conviction, and not
to rely on his confession. Therefore, to permit an inference of
guilt to be drawn from his silence, is to vitiate the full force of
the privilege. 50
Failure to produce evidence other than one's own testimony
is open to an unfavorable inference. For example: The defend-
ant was indicted for the larceny of a horse, and he refused (or
failed) to call the alleged vendor of the horse to aid him. Held:
The failure to so call was open to the inference. 51 Thus once
again we see that it is defendant's testimonial answer that is the
object of the privilege's protection.
We have progressed to the problem of waiver of the privi-
lege. The testimonial privilege is the subject of waiver as fully
as other constitutional privileges. A defendant may waive his
privilege by contract, as where an employee covenants to answer
any bill of discovery. 52 . Where an ordinary witness, (that is,
one not a defendant) waives his privilege, he must reveal all
the facts, i. e., when the witness once answers to relevant incrim-
inating questions he cannot stop 53 short, so long as the question
is "proper cross-examination." If the defendant take the stand
of his own volition, he also has waived the privilege.5 4 The gen-
eral rule is and should be, that the waiver extends to all matters
relevant to the issue, but does not go to defendant's credibility.
However, there are various modifications and restrictions de-
pendent on the various jurisdictions.
Thus a defendant testifying in his own behalf is subject to
cross-examination, in some states as to matters brought out in
40 For the sake of brevity only.
10 Wigmore 2272.
"'Peope v. Cline, 83 Cal. 374; See Wigmore, 2273, for exhaustive
treatment of when inference may be noticed.
East India Co. v. Atkcins, 1 Stra. 168.
Foster v. Pierce. 11 Cush. 437, 59 Am. Dec. 152.
54 Camminetti v. U. S., 242 U. S. 430, 37 Sup. Ct. 141, 61 L. Ed. 409,
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direct examination,5 4 and in others to all relevant matters. 55
The waiver is limited to the particular proceeding in which the
defendant volunteers the testimony. Thus, testimony contrib-
uted at a preliminary trial (as a grand jury or coroner's in-
quest) is no waiver at the main trial, later.56 Where the privi-
lege is claimed so as to prevent cross-examination, all the direct
testimony, relevant thereto may be stricken out.
57
When the accused takes the stand as a witness, he is open
to impeachment like any other witness, and evidence of his bad
character for veracity is admissible even though as a mere ac-
cused he would first have to introduce evidence of his good -be-
havior. So to put character in issue also as a witness his verac-
ity can be impeached and he cannot rebut it with evidence of
good character till the impeachment. The accused as a witness
may be impeached by proof of conviction of another crime (pref-
erably by producing the -record thereof) ; and the accused, as a
witness, is in a few states amenable, on cross-examination, to
explain specific acts of misconduct impeaching his character for
veracity.5 8
The general rule is that a witness can be cross-examined
only as to those matters brought out on direct,59 but this rule
does not embrace inquiries merely impeaching character (and
not requiring an incriminating response.)
Legal criminality consists of a liability to punishment by
law. 'When the liability is no longer existent there is a discon-
tinuance of the taint of criminality, and with that departs the
privilege. The various modes in which the liability may be term-
inated, thus effecting a dissolution of the privilege will be dis-
cussed at some length. To simplify the classification, the various
modes of dissolution will be lettered:
A. Acquittal
B. Conviction
C. Statute of Limitations
"State v. Zdano-wicz, 69 N. 3. L. 619, 55 A. T. L. 743; People v. Tice,
131 N. Y. 651, 30 N. E. 494, where the authorities are collated. In same
states, such as New Jersey, the courts have held both ways at different
times. Thus compare, State v. Sprague, 64 L. 419, 45 A. 788, with State
v. Grover, 139 A. 417.
"See note 54 supra.
Overend v. Superior Ct., 131 Cal. 280.
"Wigmore, 1391.
"Id., Sec. 2277.
9Compare the so-called Penn. and Mass. Rules.
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D. Abolition of the Crime
E. An Executive Pardon
F. Legislative Amnesty
G. Statutes Forbidding the Use of Testimony
A. An acquittal conclusively negatives crime. Therefore
no privilege can be claimed on a charge of the crime for which an
acquittal was the verdict.
B. Conviction and punishment therefor is another bar
to the privilege. The reason being self-explanatory, we pass on.
C. The bar of the statute of limitations removes the privi-
lege as the liability to punishment ceases -with the falling of the
bar. A few states, notably New Jersey, hold that with the fall-
ing of the bar, the perpetrator has a vested right not to be per-
secuted or prosecuted. 60 Thus it is seen that there is one justifi-
cation for the criminal limitations statutes. They may lead to
the divulging of information which will be of material assistance
in the apprehension of the unbarred fellow reprobates.
D. When we deliberate over the dissipation of the privi-
lege by reason of the abolition of the crime by an act passed sub-
sequent to its commission, we have one observation to make. The
statute must contain a provision exculpating all prior offenders.
,This section and C, above, are strongly similar.
E. An executive pardon, if accepted, bars the privilege,
even though there still remains possible liability of the pardoned
one for infraction of the laws of another sovereign. This is ex-
plained supra.6s The prevalent notion among the laity and not
a few of the profession is that a pardon must be accepted. It
has early, been decided, from United States v. Wilson6 2 to the
recent Burdick case,0 3 that a pardon is ineffective till accepted,
and that no executive coercion may be exercised to insure accept-
ance. The Burdick case reiterated the doctrine that despite the
fact that the witness has immunity at hand, his privilege of self-
crimination remains until he avails himself of the pardon.
The Burdick case has been greatly weakened by the
Supreme Court's later potent and portentous decision in Biddle
e' Hart Moore v. State, 43 N. J. L. 203.
'1 Supra, note 18. The prosecuting officer's promise of immunity is
not technically a pardon, and therefore the privilege should not cease.
But see the Whisky Cases, 99 U. S. 594, 25 L. Ed. 399.
27 Peters 150, 8 L Ed. 640.
"Burdick v. U. S,, 236 U. S. 79, 35 Sup. Ct. 267, 59 L. Ed. 476.
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v. Perovilh64 ruling that commutation of sentence must be
accepted. A pardon removes all legal liability, but does not
obviate the disgrace. (Query: Does it blot out guilt?) This is
one reason for allowing the accused the option of accepting or
rejecting; but as there is no constitutional privilege65 protecting
the right to refuse to answer because subjecting to disgrace, this
affects the weight of the pardon very slightly. In the old case of
Reading's Trial, 7 How St. Tr. 259, the question which we will
leave unanswered was settled: Can you ask a witness about a
crime for which he has been pardoned?
F. A legislative privilege offering amnesty for the indi-
vidual offender who shall disclose the facts of the offence upon
inquiry disintegrates the criminality and puts "finis" on the
privilege, providing, of course, that the legislature's offer is
accepted. The practical purpose of the amnesty statutes is com-
pensation enough for the dissolution of the privilege. For ex-
haustive statutory citations see Wigmore.66 The theory of these
statutes is that by expurgating the crime the privilege ceases;
this is the uniform rule.
G. This causes us to ponder. Statutes forbidding the use
of testimony do not forbid prosecution or punishment but merely
enunciate that the testimony given shall not be used elsewhere.
The early cases 67 seemed to favor these statutes, but in Counsel-
man v, Hitchcock63 the Supreme Court rendered the opinion
that nothing less than complete absolution will suffice, and there-
fore statutes merely prohibiting the use of testimony are totally
inadequate. These statutes do not prevent the prosecution from
indicting thb witness for offenses revealed by clues furnished
by his testimony. So the federal courts, followed by the states,
are today in accord on their insistence that the liability be abso-
lutely exterminated. 69
We have thus followed the privilege from its history to
those circumstances when it is nonexistent. We have seen that
'47 Sup. Ct. 664, 274 U. S. 480, 71 L. Ed. 1161.
Locate supra.
Wigmore, Sec. 2281, note 5.
People v. Kelly, 24 N. Y. 74.
142 U. S. 547, 12 Sup. Ct. 195, 35 L. Ed. 1110.
"Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 16 Sup. Ct. 644, 40 L. Ed. 819;
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 26 Sup. Ct. 37, 50 L. Ed. 652; People v.
Forbes, 143 N. Y. 219; People v. Cahil, 193 N. Y. 232, 86 N. E. 39. Twin-
ing, 211 U. S. 78.
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as a privilege it is within the control of the states7" and not that
of the United States,5 9 that the Olmstead Case, supra, is a de-
cision binding the Federal government; and lastly that our
Constitution is not fixed and immutable, but plastic and capable
of being interpreted liberally. So as we reflect on the privilege,
let us view it in the spirit which prompted Chief Justice
Marshall to say "We must never forget it is a constitution we
are expounding."
' 71
GARm WARuFLs
and
BASIL H. PoL.IT
10 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14, 53 L. E. 97;
Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Peters 243, 8 L. E. 672.
"'McCulloeh v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316, 4 L. Ed. 579.
